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Argument Priority No. 16 
DEFENDANT, APPELLANT and CROSS RESPONDENT, GUARDIAN TITLE 
COMPANY OF UTAH (hereinafter, "Guardian"), hereby replies to New 
West Federal Savings (hereinafter, "American") Brief as 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant as follows: 
REPLY TO AMERICAN'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Guardian notes that there are so many disputed material 
facts that Guardian has for the Court's benefit attached as 
Appendix "A" a copy of the "Statement of Facts" as presented by 
American in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (Record, 
p. 375-387); and attached as Appendix "B" a copy of Guardian's 
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"Response to the Statement of Facts" which was presented in 
opposition to American's Motion for Summary Judgment (Record, 
p. 513-521). 
1. American in its "Statement of Facts" (1(1., 52., and 
53.), "Brief of Respondent/Cross-Appellant" (hereinafter, 
"American's Brief"), while not directly controverting Guardian's 
"Statement of Facts", 52. and 53., seems to suggest that the 
prior commitment for title insurance was not issued correctly or 
that American's loan was made well after the time the borrowers 
"Strongs" obtained the loan from the credit union that gave rise 
to the problem. This of course, is not the case. As Guardian 
points out, in its Statement of Facts under 52., 53., and 54., 
Guardian did issue, as agent for USLife, a commitment for title 
insurance to United Savings & Loan Association, dated December 
14, 1983, that accurately and fully reflected the status of the 
title on that date. (Record, P. 514, referencing Anderson 
Deposition, Record, P. 808 [particularly, P. 526 and 527) • 
American's statements made in their Motion for Summary Judgment 
before the trial court were incorrect and not supported by the 
record at the time they were made, nor are they now in this 
regard (See 53., American's memorandum in support of its Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Record, P. 376). 
2. American in 55. in its Statement of Facts, discloses 
certain aspects of the agency contract between Guardian and 
USLife Title, the insurer, and attempts to draw certain 
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conclusions from such contract. The agency contract, which 
Guardian does not deny and certainly produced as part of 
discovery is totally irrelevant to American's rights or claims. 
Certainly American had no prior discovery or notice of the 
agency contract, other than its knowledge that at all time 
Guardian acted for and on behalf of USLife Title in issuing the 
commitment of title insurance, in closing the transaction, and 
in issuing the title policy after the closing. (Record, P. 376, 
377) . 
3. American in 56. of its Statement of Facts, states in 
pertinent part that Guardian and USLife were chosen to examine 
the state of the title and to act as escrow and closing agent on 
the loan. However, Americanfs reference to the Record does not 
support American's claim that Guardian and USLife were "chosen 
to examine the state of the title". To the contrary, there is 
no question that Guardian, as agent for USLife was expected and 
required to issue a title insurance policy insuring American's 
Trust Deed in a first lien position on the property; and in 
fact, Guardian did just that. 
4. With respect to f7., American mischaracterizes the 
escrow instructions as it did at the time of the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The escrow instructions plainly intended that 
Guardian, as agent for USLife, take such steps as were necessary 
to pay off junior liens or encumbrances, etc., so that it could 
issue a title insurance policy, insuring the Trust Deed or 
Mortgage of F.C.A., as a first lien of record (Record, P. 515; 
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Anderson Deposition, Record, P. 811 - Exhibit "1", P. 532-
533) . 
5. With respect to 18., Guardian hotly disputes this 
statement, and contends that it certainly did not become aware, 
in a conscious sense, of the existence of the "Scenic Rail Trust 
Deed" until after it recorded and disbursed the loan proceeds 
(Record, P. 516). 
6. f9. is disputed. Guardian's officers or employees did 
not become consciously aware of the existence of the Scenic Rail 
Trust Deed, prior to the closing and disbursement of funds. 
Moreover, the loan proceeds were primarily used to pay off an 
existing first trust deed loan, in favor of Deseret Federal, 
which all of the parties were aware of (Record, P. 516; and 
Anderson Deposition, Record, P. 811 - Exhibit "1", P. 531). 
7. With respect to flO., Guardian disputes the facts set 
forth therein (Record, P. 517, Addendum "B"). 
8. With respect to fll., Guardian admits that it contacted 
the borrowers, Strongs, and attempted to obtain a pay off of the 
credit union trust deed or other satisfaction respecting the 
title discrepancy, but disputes the remaining claims (Record, P. 
517, Addendum "B"). 
9. With respect to fl2., Guardian does not dispute the 
facts that it monitored the payments of the borrowers Strongs 
for a short period of time; and thereafter, relied upon 
receiving a notice of default, because it was trustee (Record, 
P. 809, Killpack Deposition, P. 40.). 
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10. With respect to fl3., the facts are hotly disputed 
and American is attempting to draw conclusions from its version 
or interpretation of the facts (Record, P. 517, Addendum "B"). 
11. With respect to fl4., Guardian does not dispute the 
facts therein, however Guardian points out that at the time the 
Strongs defaulted on the loan, the balance owed was already in 
excess of the original principal amount of American's loan and 
the maximum limit in the policy issued by Guardian on behalf of 
USLife (see Title Policy, appended as an addendum to Appellant's 
Brief). 
12. Guardian does not dispute that sometime after the 
default of the borrowers, Strongs, that American through its 
counsel commenced non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. 
However, Guardian disputes the factual implications of the 
statements respecting the foreclosure report or reports that 
American's counsel received (Record, P. 518, Addendum "B"). 
13. With respect to fl7., Guardian disputes only that the 
amount for which the property was sold by the credit union was 
not $30,000.00, but was less than $28,000.00 (Record, P. 519, 
Addendum "B"). 
14. With respect to fl8., Guardian does not dispute that 
American and its independent counsel acting as Successor Trustee 
received copies of both the Notice of Default and Notice of Sale 
of the Scenic Rail Credit Union's foreclosure; and that counsel 
for American had received a foreclosure report that listed the 
credit union's trust deed, above as item number one, before the 
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Trust Deed securing American as item two (Record, P. 808, Perry 
Deposition - Exhibit "3"). Guardian also disputes the facts as 
to whether or not counsel for American had actual present 
knowledge that the Scenic Rail trust deed was a first lien on 
the property, and superior to the lien of American, prior to the 
completion of the foreclosure sale, by counsel for Scenic Rail 
Credit Union (Record, P. 808, Perry Deposition, P. 47, Lines 21 
to 24: 
Q. You are referring to Exhibit 19. [Scenic Rail's 
Notice of Trustee's Sale]? 
A. Exhibit 19. I remember asking Susan to check and 
see if this was one that we had to worry about, 
meaning was this one that was foreclosing out our 
interest. 
15. With respect to 519., the factual statements are 
disputed (Record, P. 520, Addendum "B"). 
16. With respect to 520., Guardian disputes the factual 
statements (Record, P. 520; and Record, P. 527). 
17. With respect to 521., Guardian hotly disputes the 
factual statements therein, respecting any claim of 
confidentiality or attorney/client relationship having arisen 
(Record, P. 520; and Record, P. 526-543, "Affidavit of L. Benson 
Mabey"). 
18. With respect to 522., Guardian does not deny the 
authenticity of Exhibit "H", but does dispute the factual 
implications or statements made therein (Record, P. 520, 
Addendum "B"). 
19. With respect to 123., Guardian does not deny the 
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authenticity of Exhibit "I", but does dispute the factual 
statements made respecting the same and the conclusions drawn 
(Record, P. 520-521; and Record, P. 526-542, "Affidavit of L. 
Benson Mabey). 
20. With respect to 124., Guardian does not dispute the 
amounts claimed to be owing under the loan agreement with 
borrowers Strongs; but Guardian points out that at this time the 
amounts were in excess of the maximum coverage under the Title 
Insurance Policy. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. NEITHER GUARDIAN NOR USLIFE UNDERTOOK THE 
DUTIES OF AN ABSTRACTOR OF TITLE NOR HAD AN 
OBLIGATION TO ACCURATELY SEARCH AND REPORT UPON THE 
CONDITION OF THE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY. 
Guardian argued in Point I, of its Appellant Brief, that 
it was not liable for negligence in abstracting or claims 
arising in tort, since the transaction was completely cast and 
encompassed in contract. American argues under Point I, of its 
Respondent Brief, that Guardian must be liable on theories of 
tort, fraud, etc., but offers only generalities for the basis 
for the contention. 
American's Brief before this Court on Appeal (like its 
memorandum before the trial court) is replete with its caustic 
contention that Guardian and USLife committed a fraud upon 
American by issuing a title policy that had no exceptions from 
coverage to the credit union trust deed. In other words, a 
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policy that conformed to American's expectations and insured its 
trust deed as a first lien position on the property. 
Essentially, the argument is that Guardian and USLife did not 
simply agree to insure American's title as a first trust deed 
lien, but instead undertook to abstract and report upon the 
status of the title; and having made a mistake in such 
abstracting, they are liable for the full loan amount, as though 
they made the loan directly. 
The question of whether or not a title insurer and/or agent 
has a duty, to not only issue an insurance policy, but also to 
accurately abstract and report upon the condition of the title 
has now been conclusively resolved by the Utah Supreme Court in 
a case that was decided following the filing of Guardian's 
Appellant Brief. Culp Construction Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 137 
Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah, June 1990). 
In Culp Construction, the Utah Supreme Court was faced 
squarely with the issue as to whether or not a title insurer and 
agent are subject to a contractual duty to accurately report the 
status of the title as a necessary or integral part of the 
closing of the loan and issuance of a title insurance contract. 
The Court in deciding the issue noted that there is a split of 
authority with some jurisdictions holding that title insurance 
companies are held to a standard of liability associated with 
abstractors. However, the Court held that the better reasoned 
approach is to consider the preliminary title report, or the 
commitment for title insurance as no more than a statement of 
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the terms and conditions upon which the insurer is willing to 
issue its title policy; and, "Indeed, the prevailing view 
remains not to impose liability in tort on a title company," 
Id*. p. 6. 
The Court, in CUIP Construction, also considered the 
requirements under the insurance provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§31A-20-110(l) (1986), and determined that the duties imposed 
under the applicable statutes on title insurers respecting a 
reasonable search and examination of the tile are for the 
purpose of sound underwriting requirements and not to impose a 
duty to abstract titles and report upon the same for the benefit 
of the proposed insured, separate and apart from the title 
insurance contract. The Court 
definitively stated the policy for the decision: 
The function, form, and character of a title 
insurer is different from that of an abstractor. One 
who hires a title insurance company does so for the 
purpose of obtaining the assurance or guarantee of 
obtaining a certain position in the chain of title 
rather than for the purpose of discovering the title 
status. A title insurance company's function is 
generally confined to the practice of insurance, not 
to the practice of abstracting. Hence, Lawyers Title 
did not owe a duty to abstract the title by virtue of 
its status as a title insurance company. 
Id.f p. 6. 
While American cites the Culp Construction case as 
supporting its claim of tort, etc., its reliance is clearly 
unfounded. That is not to say that in an appropriate case, a 
breach of other duties specially undertaken that are independent 
of the insurance contract, may not give rise to causes of action 
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in tort. The Court specifically noted that this "may" be the 
case, but this is the exception not the rule and this depends 
upon the peculiar facts and circumstances involved, what 
additional duties, if any, may have been undertaken, and 
certainly is not appropriate for summary judgment. 
There is no question, based on the Utah Supreme Court's 
pronouncement in Culp Construction, as well as Beck v. Farmer's 
Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), that without a 
special factual situation, the cause of action is founded in 
contract and not in tort. This makes particular sense under the 
concept of title insurance, since there can be no recovery or 
need for the insurance, unless a defect exists at the time the 
insurance policy is committed or issued. 13A, Couch on 
Insurance, 2d §48:111. Indeed this is true, both by virtue of 
the contract of insurance which expressly excludes coverage for 
defects that arise on or after the date of the policy, usually 
the date of creation of the insured title interest, and by 
virtue of the recording statutes applicable in Utah and other 
states. There can be no indemnity claim, if a title defect does 
not exist at the time the policy is issued in the first place. 
The whole purpose is to protect the insured against actual loss 
that may subsequently arise from a known or unknown title defect 
that existed when the mortgage, deed or other interest was 
placed of record, or insured. 13A, Couch on Insurance, 2d 
§48:111. 
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There is nothing unusual about this case, despite the 
protestations and claims of fraud or misrepresentation by 
American. A commitment to insure title was issued, not to 
American or even its immediate privy in contract, FCA, but to 
United Savings. No contention or dispute exists that the 
commitment for title insurance, even if viewed as a title 
report, was fully accurate respecting the status of liens and 
encumbrances against the title to the property. In this case, 
the borrower managed to obtain a loan, which was recorded 
shortly before the closing of the loan that was subsequently 
assigned or transferred to American. Even though American's 
counsel suggests that Guardian "knew" or had "actual knowledge" 
of the existence of the trust deed securing the loan, this is 
clearly not the case as of the time the Trust Deed, securing 
American's indebtedness was placed of record, and the proceeds 
of the loan disbursed. If there is any doubt regarding this 
fact, then it is clearly and obviously disputed (Record, P. 516, 
Depositions referenced, 59.); and summary judgment was surely 
not appropriate. 
The trial judge definitely did not make such findings or 
even seriously consider this factual issue at the time the 
Summary Judgment was granted (Memorandum Decision, Appendix to 
Appellant's Brief). Obviously, from a review of the Memorandum 
Decision and follow-up Memorandum Decision (Appendix to 
Appellant's Brief), the trial judge did not consider tort 
theories or other theories; nor did the trial judge attempt to 
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distinguish between Guardian and USLife Title, or offer any 
explanation in holding that both Defendants were liable on the 
insurance contract. This is not a very weighty matter in most 
circumstance; since the insurer is the deep-pocket, and there is 
no reason to be very concerned in distinguishing between the two 
parties. However, because of the peculiar circumstances that 
arose, well after the conclusion of the matter, this has become 
important and a vital issue, which may require a remand by this 
Court for further consideration by the trial court for 
appropriate resolution. 
POINT II, NEITHER GUARDIAN OR USLIFE HAVE ANY 
SPECIAL STATUTORY DUTIES SEPARATE AND APART FROM THE 
TITLE INSURANCE CONTRACT. 
American in Point I, Subpart "D", of its Respondent Brief, 
states that USLife and Guardian breached statutory duties that 
give rise to an independent cause of action, separate from the 
insurance policy provisions. It has already been noted, that 
the recent decision in Culp Construction, has determined after 
an evaluation and discussion of such statutory duties under Utah 
Code Ann., Title 31A, that the legislative intention was not to 
impose a requirement to abstract and correctly report the status 
of the title to the proposed insured, but was instead for the 
purpose of sound underwriting respecting the issuance of the 
insurance policy. Nonetheless, American cites Utah Code Ann. 
§31A-23-308, and related provisions for the proposition that 
Guardian and USLife breached duties owed to American. 
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The provisions primarily deal with an insurers and agents 
responsibility, to make proper disclosures to the public, so as 
not to contribute to unfair competition. Primarily, the 
requirements deal with prohibitions on communications which 
contain false or misleading information relating to the 
insurance contract. 
In this case, of course, Guardian issued a perfectly 
accurate title insurance commitment (accurate, even if measured 
by abstracting standards) . When Guardian on behalf of USLife 
recorded American's Trust Deed and disbursed the loan proceeds, 
it obviously, then had a duty to comply with the commitment and 
instructions given by American to issue a title insurance policy 
insuring American's Trust Deed, as a first lien against the 
subject property. Even though Guardian discovered after the 
recordation of the Trust Deed and disbursement of the proceeds, 
that a new trust deed in favor of Scenic Rail Credit Union had 
been missed, it had no choice but to issue the insurance 
indemnity policy, as bargained for by American. The mistake, 
notwithstanding, it complied with its commitment and under no 
reasonable view could have done otherwise. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, American apparently seems 
to miss the fact that the statutes that it relies upon, Utah 
Code Ann., Title 31A, Chapter 23, was newly enacted in 1985, as 
a part of the insurance recodification. The effective date set 
by the legislature was July 1, 1986 (Utah Senate Bill, No. 232 
§59) . The transactions complained about by American and the 
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contract of insurance was issued on or about March to May of 
1984, at least two (2) years prior to the effective date of the 
statutory provisions. 
It is well known and well accepted that statutory law is 
not given retroactive effect, unless the legislature expressly 
declared an intention to do so. Washington National Ins. Co. v. 
Sherwood Assoc. , 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Ct. App. June 1990) . In 
this case the legislature was not merely silent about the 
effective date and application of the chapter, but instead chose 
and effective date that was more than a year from the date of 
enactment. There is no question and no doubt that these 
statutory sections do not apply in any respect to the claims 
asserted by American. 
POINT III. GUARDIAN ACTED AT ALL TIMES AS DISCLOSED 
AGENT FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE INSURER, USLIFE 
TITLE, AND GUARDIAN IS NOT SEPARATELY LIABILE TO 
AMERICAN. 
American under Point I. "E", of its Brief, states that 
Guardian is liable for its own action in contract and tort. 
American appears to agree with Guardian on the general 
proposition, universally embraced by case law, that an agent is 
not liable for contracts undertaken on behalf of a disclosed 
principal, within the scope of his authority. American, 
however, goes on to state that an agent can be liable, 
independently, of the principal for separate acts of fraud or 
torts committed in connection with his activities or for 
separate and independent contracts that an agent undertakes on 
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its own behalf. American then cites certain cases and treatises 
for this proposition, including two Utah cases. Such cases and 
treatises deal specifically with independent torts committed by 
the agent that clearly violate separate duties, whether 
performed under the auspices of the principal or not. Guardian 
has no quarrel whatsoever with this general proposition cited by 
American. 
Guardian, however, fails to see how this relates to the 
clear contractual obligation undertaken by Guardian, as agent 
for USLife, in this particular case. It has already been noted 
that some jurisdictions hold an agent liabile along with the 
insured for negligence in abstracting as an implied duty arising 
from the insurance. However, the Utah Supreme Court in Culp 
Construction has laid to rest any notions that title insurance 
is anything other than a clear indemnity contract to protect 
against adverse claims existing of record in the title. Thus, 
the Court has clearly stated that there is no tort duty or duty 
of abstracting or disclosure separate and independent from the 
contract of insurance, unless the duty arises out of special 
facts or relations involved in the case. 
In this case, there was no request whatsoever by American 
or its predecessor for an updated title report or commitment 
prior to the closing, disbursement of the loan proceeds and 
recordation of the Trust Deed, which was insured. Moreover, 
there is no dispute that the original commitment issued 
approximately three (3) months prior to the actual loan closing 
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was accurate in all respects. In this case, what American 
bargained to get was exactly what it did get, a title policy or 
indemnity contract to cover actual loss if its Trust Deed was 
not in a first lien position on the property. 
Neither Guardian nor USLife disputed before the trial court 
that such contract was properly issued and in full force and 
effect; and in fact, protected American against loss, actually 
flowing from a defect in the title of security interest. In 
fact, as pointed out previously, USLife paid the amount that it 
believed was properly due and owing for the claim. The amount 
that would have discharged the lien that should have been junior 
to American's position. Whether or not USLife had a greater 
liability under the policy is not usually or customarily the 
function of the agent to determine nor the responsibility of the 
agent to insure or guarantee. 
This rule has its foundation in good sense and reason. An 
examination of the Title 31A insurance provisions, that American 
is so eager to point to, will support the proposition that the 
requirements on financial responsibility for an insurer, 
overwhelm and greatly exceed any requirements upon an agent, who 
can only act by specific appointment for an insurer. There can 
be no doubt that American did not rely upon Guardian's financial 
strength and ability to guarantee or assure it that the title 
position that it wished to have insured would be protected 
against loss. Obviously, title insurance agents, as with all 
other insurance agents, are smaller generally in size and scope 
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and may even be comprised of classes of individuals that come 
and go without significant event in the insurance field. 
However, insurers are expected to be the deep-pocket and 
expected to be the parties responsible to make good on losses or 
claims. 
As pointed out before in this Brief, the trial court, as 
evidenced by its Memorandum Decisions (Appendix to Appellant's 
Brief) made no distinction and offered no rationale for holding 
Guardian liabile on the insurance contract with USLife. 
Clearly, the trial court did not consider any factual questions 
that might independently imply or suggest that Guardian had any 
duties or was liable, independently of USLife, whether in tort 
or otherwise. In this regard, 4, Couch on Insurance, 2d 
§26A:288, states: 
When the agent of the insurer acts in an authorized 
non-tortious manner, he is not personally liable to 
the insured for his acts or for any contracts which 
he makes on behalf of his disclosed principal. [Cited 
cases omitted]. 
The few exceptions to this general policy have been noted, 
separate tortious activity, failure to procure the insurance 
contract, failure to disclose the principal. Id. , §26A:289, 
290, 292. 
In this case, American makes some reference to the escrow 
instructions that it admits were directed to Guardian and 
USLife. Guardian contends that the escrow instructions were 
clearly directed to Guardian, as agent for USLife, rather than 
in a separate capacity. Such instructions, clearly refer to a 
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commitment for title insurance and require that Guardian, on 
behalf of USLife, takes such steps as are necessary to record 
and insure the Trust Deed of American as a first lien upon the 
subject property. American contends that something more was 
intended or implied by such instructions. 
Essentially, American is suggesting that there should be 
two contracts of insurance issued: one by Guardian, by virtue of 
the escrow instructions, and another that Guardian was required 
to issue, as agent for USLife, under the escrow instructions; 
both of which were intended to accomplish the same purpose. The 
problem with this notion is that there was no separate 
consideration whatsoever for Guardian assuming the obligation to 
act as an insurer of the title, rather than acting as it did, 
merely as a agent for USLife, which was the insurer. 
The only consideration that American gave for its title 
indemnity or insurance contract, was the title insurance premium 
that was remitted for and on behalf of USLife. Obviously, 
Guardian shared in the premium, but it did so as an agent for 
USLife under its own separate agency contract, which controls 
and governs the amount of remuneration that Guardian would 
receive by and through USLife. Where no separate fee or 
consideration is given, there can be no separate obligation 
arising apart from the title insurance contract, which was 
expected. Anderson v. Title Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 82 (Idaho 1982). 
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POINT IV. THE TITLE POLICY IS A CONTRACT OF 
INDEMNITY AND AMERICAN'S CLAIMS ARE MERGED INTO AND 
LIMITED TO THE CONTRACT. 
American under Point II. A, of its Brief, argues that the 
Title Policy was a contract of warranty rather than indemnity. 
American appears to misapprehend when and how a distinction 
between the two types of contracts occurs. The distinction if 
any, clearly depends upon the actual language of the contract. 
In this case, the contract does not insure the title of an 
owner, but instead insures the title of a lender, and by its 
terms limits the company's (USLife's) liability to the actual 
loss sustained by the insured, as a result of a defect, not to 
exceed the maximum amount specified in the policy. Indeed, the 
cases cited by American for the proposition that it is a 
contract of warranty, do not even attempt to make the 
distinction, but instead clearly support the proposition that 
damages and claims are limited to the terms of the policy. 
Zions First National Bank, N.A. v. National American Title Ins. 
Co. , 749 P. 2d 651 (Utah 1988); see also, Espinoza v. Safeco 
Title Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 1979). 
American then launches into an analysis that really turns 
upon the question of damages and when the same are sustained by 
the insured, rather than relating to a distinction between the 
nature of the contract as indemnity or warranty. As pointed 
out, the Utah cases make it clear that the terms of the contract 
prevail, particularly as they relate to a lender's policy 
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against loss or damage sustained or incurred by reason of the 
defect in the title. 
This distinction may become more apparent in the 
determination of the timing and amount of loss incurred. 
Notwithstanding the trial court's quote from Appleman's 
Insurance Law & Practice for the notion that a defect existing 
at the outset constitutes a breach, there can be no covered 
defect if it does exist at the outset, as already pointed out. 
Thus, the more important matter is when must damages be paid and 
what is the measure of such damages. 9, Appleman's Insurance 
Law & Practice. §5216, states: 
A title insurance policy is one of indemnity, so that 
the insured is entitled to recover only the actual 
loss which he has sustained by virtue of title 
defects, encumbrances, and the like. 
As pointed out by Appleman's, ordinarily damages are 
measured by the difference between the value of the property 
insured as it was with the defect insured against, and its value 
as it would have been had there been no such defect. Id. , 
§5216, p. 102. Even in the event of a total loss of a 
mortgage, as a result of sale under a prior mortgage in 
existence on the date of the policy (the case here) , the insurer 
is held liable only for the actual value of the land, if less 
than the amount of the mortgage insured. Id.. §5216, p. 109. 
To the same effect is 15A, Couch on Insurance, 2d §57:179, 
stating: 
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Title insurance is solely a contract of 
indemnity and the insured is entitled to recover only 
his actual loss, and cannot make the contract one of 
profit to him, recovery is limited to the amount 
necessary to remove the title defect. Id., p. 198. 
As stated in 15A, Couch on Insurance, 2d §57:189, with respect 
to the insured interest of a mortgagee in the property, even 
with a complete failure of the mortgagee's tile, if the value of 
the mortgage property is less than the amount due on the 
mortgage, it is generally held and recognized that the mortgagee 
can recover only the value of the property, not the amount due 
on the mortgage. The rule is one of reason based on damages 
generally, as stated: 
The foregoing rule is based upon the nature of the 
obligation undertaken by the insurer when it issues 
a title policy, the policy insuring the title and not 
the security; that is, it undertakes to indemnify 
against loss or damage sustained by reason of defects 
of title or liens upon the land, but it does not 
guarantee that either the mortgage premises are worth 
the amount of the mortgage or that the mortgage debt 
will be paid. Id., p. 205. 
The foregoing universal- statements regarding damages, are 
based upon the sensible rule that the mortgagee should be 
entitled to the benefit of its bargain, but no more. In other 
words, applying these rules to American's loan, there should be 
no doubt that once the borrower filed bankruptcy (after two (2) 
years of monthly payments on the secured indebtedness) and the 
personal liability was discharged, then American could expect to 
look only to the value of the security, with the reasonable 
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expectation that it had a first lien secured by the property. 
Thus, American cannot be entitled to more than the value of the 
collateral and the proceeds that could be expected from the 
liquidation of such collateral, as is customarily with a 
commercial lender. Surely American expected no more under these 
circumstances. It could not expect to obtain more than the face 
amount of the policy and the original principal amount of the 
indebtedness, solely because a title defect existed, which it 
claims it was unaware of throughout the entirety of its 
proceedings. Thus, it should not be able to achieve a windfall 
benefit, but should only be restored to the position that it 
would have been in, had title been as indemnified and insured. 
POINT V. GUARDIAN IS NOT LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION OR FOR FRAUD, 
American under Point III of its Memorandum, asserts that 
Guardian and USLife are liable for negligent misrepresentation 
citing as support, Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. 
Co. , 666 P. 2d 302 (Utah 1983) . The case set forth the elements 
of negligent misrepresentation, and found that Commonwealth was 
liable for its activities, taken as an escrow agent, 
specifically for affirmative representations that it made to a 
lender respecting the subject matter of the escrow and the 
release of lots thereunder. 
The case is entirely distinguishable from the present case, 
because Commonwealth was hired specifically for the handling of 
an ongoing escrow involving the receipt of funds and release of 
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lots, for which it was paid continuing escrow fees. In 
contrast, the escrow that Guardian undertook, as agent for 
USLife, in recording the Trust Deed of American and disbursing 
the proceeds, was incidental to and a necessary part of the 
issuance of the title insurance contract insuring American's 
lien as a first and paramount lien, which was the primary object 
of the escrow. 
In the Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title case, there 
was no privity of contract between the lender to whom the 
representation as to the status of the lots was made, but 
Commonwealth specifically acknowledged the status in writing, 
and knew that the lender would rely upon the same. 
In this case, Guardian had issued a commitment for title 
insurance to United Savings, and as pointed out before, even if 
it were viewed as an abstract of title, it was absolutely 
correct and without fault whatsoever. American did not request 
any updated title report immediately prior to closing, or at any 
time prior to closing, nor after the closing. Instead, it 
requested under the fair interpretation of the escrow 
instructions, is a title policy insuring the Trust Deed as a 
first lien, and this is exactly what Guardian did on behalf of 
USLife. Thus, there was clearly privity of contract here, and 
under such circumstances, the contract as contemplated by the 
parties, governs and controls the claims respecting liability 
and measurement of loss or damages, just as the parties expected 
and bargained. This is certainly Utah law, as clearly expressed 
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in the Zions First National Bank, N.A. v. National American 
Title Ins, Co, case, the Valley Bank & Trust Co, v. USLife Title 
Ins, Co,, 776 P.2d 933 (Utah App. 1989), and is consistent with 
the holding in Culp Construction, 
The escrow instructions specifically reference the 
commitment for title insurance, and the commitment by its terms 
incorporates the form of policy intended to be issued in 
accordance with the commitment. The policy that was issued 
conformed to the commitment and expectation of American, and 
contained a provision under §11, that is commonly referred to as 
an integration/merger clause. It states in pertinent part that 
liability is limited to the policy and that any claim of loss or 
damage, whether or not based on negligence, which arises out of 
the status of the lien of the mortgage or the title to the 
estate or interest covered by the contract, or any action 
asserting such claim, is restricted to the provisions and 
conditions stipulated in the policy. 
Guardian acted as a clear and disclosed agent for USLife 
in issuing both the commitment (which incorporated the form of 
policy and §11 integration/merger clause), and in issuing the 
policy which insured the mortgage of American, as requested and 
directed in the escrow instructions, incorporating the 
commitment and form of policy by reference. Since Guardian 
signed the contract, as it was authorized to do on behalf of 
USLife, as USLife!s disclosed agent, it was surely intended that 
the protection of the integration/merger clause under §11 of the 
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policy, was intended to cover Guardian as well as USLife. This 
is straight forward contract law and the favored approach, as 
demonstrated by the foregoing cited cases, as well as Beck v. 
Farmer's Insurance Exchange. 
There is not even a hint that American cannot be made whole 
under the direct terms of the contract, as the parties expected 
and agreed. The contract, expressly by its terms, indemnifies 
American from actual loss it sustained, as a result of or 
proximately caused by the defect in the title interest insured. 
In this case, an argument and dispute has existed between 
USLife, as the insurer and American, as to the extent of such 
loss and the cause of such loss. As pointed out before, USLife 
has vigorously defended under the issue of mitigation of 
damages, and has contended the factual issues are unresolved in 
this regard. Whatever the result of that dispute, nonetheless, 
Guardian is not the party that contracted to insure or indemnify 
American. Guardian acted as an agent as previously stated and 
did issue the contract of insurance, which USLife has 
acknowledged was validly issued, and has relied upon in its 
defense. 
American, again under Point III., asserts that Guardian and 
USLife committed a fraud upon American, apparently by having 
issued the contract of title insurance, as specified and 
required by American. American still doesn't seem to understand 
the import of the Culp Construction case. It held that neither 
the commitment for title insurance, nor the title insurance 
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policy constitute representations or reports, as to the status 
of the title to the property. To the contrary, it is just what 
it purports to be, and what American expected it to be, a 
contract of insurance. If there was any merit at all to 
American's claims that Guardian somehow undertook the additional 
duty to insure title, in its own separate capacity rather than 
under the Title Policy that it issued for USLife, then such 
questions did not form the basis for the trial court's decision, 
and are extremely factually sensitive and preclude summary 
judgment, at least against Guardian, as noted in the Culp 
Construction case. 
POINT VI, AMERICAN'S CLAIMS OF ESTOPPEL OR STRICT 
LIABILITY AS A RESULT OF THE ALLEGED ACTION OF 
COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES IS WHOLLY WITHOUT MERIT, 
American asserts under Point II, Subparts "E." and "F.", 
of its Memorandum, that Guardian and USLife are estopped from 
denying coverage and/or liability of the policy by virtue of the 
purported contacts or communications between counsel for 
Guardian and counsel for American. This position is urged, 
presumably as an alternative basis for affirming the trial 
court's judgment. The trial court, of course, found liability 
under the contract and made no findings respecting the hotly 
disputed factual issue which counsel for American has raised. 
The factual statements made by Mr. Perry are directly 
contradicted by Mr. Mabey's Affidavit, particularly f4. thereof. 
(Record, p. 526-530). Even Mr. Perry's statements about the 
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letter appended as Exhibit "G" from Guardian's counsel, do not 
appear accurate and don't support the claims that American is 
making. The discussion, as represented by Mr. Perry, turned on 
possible remedial actions that could be taken, rather than the 
factual basis for the claim under the policy. 
Moreover, contrary to Mr. Perry's claim that Mr. Mabey led 
him to believe he was undertaking in some confidential fashion, 
the legal representation of American in the remedial efforts, 
the letter that was sent at the outset of the conversations, in 
response to the claim letter of American (Exhibit MG!! to 
American's Brief) states in the first paragraph that Mr. Mabey 
represents Guardian, and does not suggest that he represents 
USLife. It also makes clear in the third paragraph that the 
remedial action that was taken on behalf of American was done 
under reservation of rights respecting defenses under the 
Policy; and on the second page, specifically advises American 
that its counsel is Lester Perry, who is receiving copies of the 
pleadings and to whom inquiries should be made by American. 
This certainly doesn't suggest any surprise or advantage 
was taken of Mr. Perry, and Mr. Perry doesn't suggest how his 
conversation with Mr. Mabey created prejudice to him or to 
American. In any event, American's claim in this regard is an 
attempt to enforce liability under the contract, and such 
liability is upon the insurer, USLife, and not upon the agent, 
Guardian. The defense respecting the discussions of counsel, 
are clearly fraught with material factual dispute and cannot 
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serve as the basis for a summary judgment against Guardian. 
POINT VII. AMERICAN IS ENTITLED TO THE ACTUAL LOSS 
THAT IT SUSTAINED BY REASON OF THE TITLE DEFECT, 
American argues under Point IV, that American is entitled 
to recovery of the entire amount of the debt, together with 
interest, without regard to the value of the collateral. 
Guardian has already pointed out in its Appellant's Brief and 
under Point II herein, that American's position is incorrect and 
the trial judge erroneously determined damages on the basis of 
the full indebtedness, even in excess of the face amount on the 
insurance policy. 
Judge Moffat cited Appleman's in support of his erroneous 
assessment of damages, but Appleman's is clearly to the 
contrary. 9, Appleman's Insurance Law & Practice, §520, states: 
In no way, however, does a title insurance policy 
guarantee the validity of the mortgage debt, the note 
on which it is based, nor good faith of a vendor—its 
concern being with the title, rather than any 
indebtedness. [Numerous case citations omitted]. Id. , 
p. 3 5 and 36. 
American contends that it would not have allowed the loan 
to close and its money disbursed, if American had known of the 
defect that occurred in its lien position. This would seem 
obviously to be true in all situations in which title insurance 
is issued. In fact it makes up the whole point for the 
indemnity contract. In other words, if the parties did not 
contemplate the possibility that a prior encumbrance of record 
may be missed, or that a defect in the title could occur or 
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exist as of the date of the recordation of American's lien, then 
there would be no reason for the title insurance contract 
because there would be nothing to protect against. 
If Guardian would have known about the existence of the 
Scenic Rail trust deed, at the time it recorded the lien of 
American and disbursed the loan proceeds, it surely would not 
have done so. Again this seems obvious in all situations; if 
there is an actual defect that gives rise to the purpose for the 
insurance contract or policy, then the insurer or its agent 
would rather have avoided the potential or actual loss that 
would later flow from the defect. 
Nonetheless, neither Guardian nor USLife intended to or 
became loan underwriters with American. There should be no 
doubt that American relied not only upon its security in the 
real property, but also upon the credibility of the borrowers, 
demonstrated from past loan performance and other financial 
information. Guardian was not privy to any such information and 
there is no suggestion in the escrow instructions that Guardian 
or USLife had any duty to evaluate the borrowers1 ability to pay 
or to do anything other than to insure the title or take steps 
to put the title in a position where it can be insured as a 
first lien. 
American does not dispute that if USLife had paid off the 
Scenic Rail trust deed, at any time prior to the Trustee's 
foreclosure sale by Scenic Rail, that American would have had 
exactly what it bargained for, a first lien upon the property 
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and a right to resort to the collateral. The peculiar fact that 
the borrower, after faithfully making monthly payments for two 
years, had an adverse financial turn and declared bankruptcy, is 
an expectation and likelihood that can occur with any loan; and 
something, no doubt, that American was familiar with by its own 
loan underwriting experience. This certainly was not caused by 
the defect in the insured lien title, in fact it was entirely 
independent and had nothing whatsoever to do with it. 
The balance due on the indebtedness at the time of the 
first default of the borrower, on February 1, 198 6, was in 
excess of the original loan principal amount and the face amount 
of the policy. This was the amount Judge Moffat used and then 
accrued interest at the high loan rate of 12 3/4% thereafter, 
all without regard to the value of the collateral, or even the 
date of loss of the secured lien. 
In fact the secured lien was not lost until more than a 
year later, even though interest was accruing in excess of 
twelve percent (12%) on the loan during this entire time; and it 
would not have been recoverable due to the lower fair market 
value of the collateral. At least, Guardian contends that the 
value of the collateral was not more than $70,000.00 to 
$75,000.00, at the date it was lost as security for the loan 
(February 1987) ; and American has offered no competent evidence, 
otherwise. 
If American's title would have been exactly as insured, 
then it would have had to complete a foreclosure sale, that it 
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was apparently not even pursuing, despite the default for a 
year; and then, after it vested itself in title to the property, 
it would have been required to liquidate the collateral and 
would typically have incurred selling expenses, including a real 
commission in doing so. All of this would not have been 
accomplished sooner than a few months, on a typical basis. 
There is nothing in the title insurance contract or in any 
other documents or express or implied in the relationship that 
remotely suggests that because of the title defect, the risk of 
loss of the indebtedness is totally shifted to the title 
insurer, and certainly it is not shifted to the agent. Even if 
American could muster a sufficient factual basis for a claim, 
arising out of an independent duty of Guardian to have properly 
abstracted the title, it would not then be an action in 
contract, it would surely be in tort as American contends. 
Under these circumstances, the damages would still be the 
actual loss American sustained; and this certainly does not 
ignore the facts and circumstances involved, including the value 
of the collateral, which was the only thing American could 
expect to look to, once the borrowers were discharged of 
personal liability by their bankruptcy, which had nothing to do 
with any duties undertaken by Guardian. 
American, at best view, is entitled to the benefit of its 
bargain, and that is to have USLife discharge the insured 
obligation (assuming arguendo that mitigation of damages is not 
an issue) by paying the difference between the value of the 
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collateral, at the date of loss, less typical liquidation 
expenses experienced by American in its business which were 
avoided. This matter must be tried as contended by both 
Guardian and USLife before the trial court, since no evidence on 
the fair market value was offered. 
CONCLUSION 
American has failed to offer a reasonable substantive basis 
for its claim that liability should be found, otherwise, than 
under the express and clear terms of the title insurance 
contract that it accepted and made with USLife. The case law in 
Utah, as well as the treatises, overwhelmingly support liability 
founded upon the express terms of the contract; particularly 
where there is no showing of disadvantage to American in being 
limited to recovery of its actual damages, as opposed to a 
windfall that has no relationship to the loss it would have 
sustained, notwithstanding the title defect. 
Guardian acted solely as an agent for the insurer and 
undertook no special or separate duties not merged and 
integrated into the insurance contract, by the express terms of 
§11 thereof. While Guardian may be liable to USLife, that issue 
is not the subject matter of the judgment, and is still a 
pending issue before the trial court. It is, nonetheless, not 
liable to American, who is entitled to recompense from USLife 
for its actual damage that must be proved by evidence. 
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If there were any doubt at all respecting Guardian's acting 
merely as an agent for USLife, then any alleged other duties 
would be a matter of material factual determination, not 
susceptible to summary judgment. Moreover, no separate duties 
were considered by the trial court and none formed the basis for 
the trial court's judgment, which was based solely on the 
contract and did not even suggest a reason for Guardian's 
liability jointly with USLife. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3rd day of October, 1990. 
- 2 ^ a ^ 
L. BENSON MABEY^ 
Murphy, Tolboe & Mabey 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Appellant and Cross-Respondent, 
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH 
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same in U.S. mails, postage prepaid, this 3rd day of October, 
1990: 
Lester A. Perry 
KESLER & RUST 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
3 6 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. Stephen S. Durish 
of Travis County, Texas 
P.O. Box 2800 
Austin, TX 78762-2800 
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ADDINBUM "A" 
Lester A. Perry - A2571 
WOODBURY, BETTILYON, JENSEN, 
KESLER & SWINTON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
19 West South Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-1100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN ) 
ASSOCIATION, a California ] 
corporation, ) 
Plaintiff ] 
vs. ] 
USLIFE TITLE INSURANCE ] 
COMPANY OF DALLAS a/k/a TITLE ] 
USA INSURANCE CORPORATION,.a ] 
Texas corporation and GUARDIAN ] 
TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH, a Utah ] 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
i MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
) AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. C87-4811 
) Judge Richard F. Moffat 
Plaintiff, American Savings and Loan Association 
("American"), hereby submits the following memorandum of points and 
authorities in support of its motion for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this motion only, the plaintiff submits 
that the uncontested facts are as follows: 
1. M. Lynn Strong and Cherie G. Strong owned a single 
family residence located at 7629 South 835 East, Midvale, Utah (the 
"Property"). (USLife Cross-Claim Paragraph 7 and Guardian Title 
Answer to Cross-Claim Paragraph 3.) 
2. On December 30, 1983, the Strongs obtained a loan in 
the amount of $31,300.00 from Scenic Rail Credit Union ("Scenic 
Rail"). Scenic Rail secured the loan with a trust deed on the 
property which trust deed was entitled "Second Trust Deed". This 
trust deed was recorded on February 14, 1984 in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office. (USLife Cross-Claim Paragraph 7 and Guardian 
Title Answer to Cross-Claim Paragraph 3.) 
3. The Strongs thereafter approached United Savings and 
Loan Association ("United") for a loan secured by the Property. 
United brokered the loan to FCA Mortgage Corporation ("FCA"). FCA 
was acting on behalf of its parent, American. The loan from 
American was to be for $81,400.00 with interest of 12.75% per annum 
and was to be secured by a first trust deed on the Property. 
(Complaint Paragraph 6; Guardian Title Answer Paragraph 5; Killpack 
Deposition Pages 18 and 19; Anderson Deposition Pages 24 through 31; 
Exhibit 1, Page 532, Line 810 (Closing Statement), Anderson 
Deposition.) 
4. Guardian Title Company of Utah ("Guardian") is a Utah 
corporation, doing business in Utah as a duly qualified and 
authorized title agent. (Complaint Paragraphs 3 and 5; Guardian 
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Title Answer Paragraphs 1 and 3; Title Policy which is Exhibit "A" 
of Complaint.) 
5. Guardian represented USLife Title Insurance Company of 
Dallas, aka Title USA Insurance Company, ("USLife") as its agent. 
Guardian and USLife had executed a Contract of Agency, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", which granted the following 
authority to Guardian: 
(a) to issue title insurance commitments and title 
insurance policies up to a $300,000 policy limit (Section I); 
(b) to examine the title of the property insured to 
determine any and all express exceptions and exclusions from the 
policy such as the Scenic Rail trust deed (Section II); 
(c) to correctly reflect tne condition of the title on 
the title insurance commitments and title policies (Section III); 
(d) to collect premiums and pay USLife its share of 
twenty percent (20%) as an "underwriting risk" premium (Sections IV 
and V); and 
(e) to properly and regularly close the transaction on 
which the commitment or policy was predicated (Section VI). (USLife 
Cross-Claim Paragraph 2 and Exhibit "B" to said Cross-Claim; 
Guardian Title Answer to Cross-Claim Paragraph 1.) 
6. Guardian and USLife were chosen to examine the state 
of the title on the Property, to close the loan between the Strongs 
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and American, to act as escrow and closing agent, to take possession 
of $81,400,00 in loan proceeds from American, and to disburse the 
proceeds according to written escrow/closing instructions from 
American, and to issue a title policy for $81,400.00 insuring 
American's trust deed as a first position lien on the Property. The 
closing was held and Guardian recorded American's trust deed on 
March 14, 1984 in the records of the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
Office. On or about March 23, 1984, Guardian and USLife issued a 
title policy insuring American's trust deed in first position, a 
copy of said policy is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". (Complaint 
Paragraphs 6 and 7; USLife's Answer Paragraphs 6 and 7; Guardian 
Title's Answer Paragraphs 2 and 3; USLife Cross-Claim Paragraphs 3, 
4, 5 and 6; and Guardian Title's Answer to Cross-Claim Paragraphs 1 
and 2). 
7. The closing, escrow ani disbursal of loan proceeds 
were governed by written Escrow Instructions from American to 
Guardian and USLife that the policy wa« to insure the American Trust 
Deed as a "first and paramount lien of record" and "pay off any and 
all liens on the subject property" ahead of American's trust deed, a 
copy of said instructions are attached hereto as Exhibit "C". The 
instructions were received and acknowledged in writing by Guardian's 
escrow/closing officer, Ms. Fay Anderson. (Anderson Deposition Page 
48 and Deposition Exhibit 1, Pages 533 and 534 of said Exhibit). 
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8. During the title search of the Property and prior to 
closing, Guardian became aware of the Scenic Rail loan and trust 
deed that, even though it was entitled "Second Trust Deed", was 
superior to the trust deed of American that would be recorded at 
closing. (Complaint Paragraphs 23 and 38; Guardian Title Answer 
Paragraphs 19 and 26; USLife Answer Paragraphs 14 and 23; Anderson 
Deposition Pages 31 through 46 (particularly pages 45 and 46) and 
Exhibit 2 of said deposition; Killpack Deposition Page 22.) 
9. Notwithstanding the clear escrow instructions of 
American, Guardian and USLife closed the American loan even though 
the Scenic Rail trust deed was superior in priority to American's 
trust deed. Guardian's closing officer, Ms. Anderson, knew that the 
Scenic Rail trust deed would have to be paid off from American's 
loan proceeds, but failed to do so. The title policy showing 
American in a first priority position, without mention of the Scenic 
Rail trust deed, was issued by Guardian and USLife on or about March 
23, 1984, approximately one week after closing. However, prior to 
signing the policy, Ms. Anderson became aware that the loan proceeds 
from American, that should have been used to pay off Scenic Rail, 
were mistakenly disbursed by her office to the Strongs. The Scenic 
Rail trust deed had not been paid off. Ms. Anderson advised her 
superiors, including Ms. Killpack, Guardian's vice-president and 
office manager, and Mr. Warren Curlis, Guardian's president and 
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owner. These individuals, as employees of Guardian, and as agent of 
USLife, consciously chose to issue and sign the title policy showing 
American in first position. They did so clearly aware of their 
liability to American and the representation in the policy that 
American was in first position. The policy was signed and sent to 
American in Stockton, California showing its trust deed in a first 
position and not mentioning in any manner the Scenic Rail trust 
deed. (Anderson Deposition Pages 51 through 54 and Exhibit "8" of 
Anderson Deposition.) 
10. American was under the belief that the loan was 
closed as it had instructed, i.e., that its trust deed was in a 
first priority position. USLife, its agent Guardian, and Guardian's 
officers and employees, chose not to advise American that its lien 
was in second priority behind Scenic Rail for they realized Guardian 
and USLife were liable to American under the policy. (Anderson 
Deposition Pages 53, 62 and 63 and Killpack Deposition Pages 30 and 
32. ) 
11. Guardian and USLife tried to cover up the problem by 
not notifying American of what had happened, by contacting the 
Strongs to coerce their payment of the Scenic Rail trust deed, and 
by contacting Scenic Rail to obtain a subordination agreement. The 
Strongs told Guardian that they could not immediately pay off the 
Scenic Rail trust deed because the windfall they had mistakenly 
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received at closing had been put into "investments"- Scenic Rail 
refused to sign a subordination agreement because the property was 
not worth enough to secure both the American loan and its loan. 
These conversations took place for approximately one to two months 
after the closing, i.e., April and May of 1984. (Anderson 
Deposition Pages 54 through 61 and Killpack Deposition Pages 24 
through 28.) 
12. No further effort was made to resolve the problem by 
Guardian or USLife or to notify American of the problem. No one at 
Guardian felt it was their responsibility to obtain release of the 
Scenic Rail trust deed. Nor was there any attempt to monitor the 
Strongs timely payment of the monthly installments under the Scenic 
Rail note and trust deed. (Anderson Deposition Pages 61 through 63, 
Killpack Deposition Pages 24 through 32.) 
13. Notwithstanding the fact that Guardian and USLife 
knew that they could have recorded a Request for Notice pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-26, requesting notice of any foreclosure 
proceeding by Scenic Rail, they failed to do so. Instead, Guardian 
and USLife concluded that if Scenic Rail foreclosed, they would rely 
upon American to contact them and advise them of the foreclosure. 
Yet, Guardian and USLife refused to notify American of the Scenic 
Rail trust deed so that American would not file a claim under the 
title policy. (Killpack Deposition Pages 28 through 31.) 
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14. On February 1, 1986, the Strongs defaulted on their 
loan with American• At that time, the balance due to American was 
$80,939.35 principal, together with accrued interest and reserve 
fund shortage of $1,712.16. (Affidavit of American.) 
15. On August 8, 1986, the Strongs filed a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy petition and obtained a full discharge of their assets 
without payment of dividends to any unsecured creditors or to 
American. Their bankruptcy was a "no asset" case. (Complaint 
Paragraphs 9 and 11; Affidavit of American.) 
16. Shortly after the default of the Strongs on 
American's loan, American commenced foreclosure against the 
Property. The foreclosure was stayed by the Strong's bankruptcy. 
In conjunction with the foreclosure, American's trustee, Mr. Lester 
A. Perry of Kirton, McConkie £ Bushnell, obtained a foreclosure 
report from another title company listing the Scenic Rail trust deed 
as a "Second Trust Deed". A meticulous review of the foreclosure 
report would have revealed that the recording date of the Scenic 
Rail trust deed was prior to the recording date of American's trust 
deed. However, this fact was not noticed because the trust deed was 
listed as a "Second Trust Deed" and an inspection of the USLife 
title policy indicated that American's trust deed was in a first 
position. It was believed that the Scenic Rail trust deed was in 
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fact a "Second Trust Deed". (Perry Deposition Page 18; Burns 
Deposition Pages 21 and 49.) 
17. The Strongs also defaulted on their loan with Scenic 
Rail and foreclosure was commenced on its trust deed by recording a 
Notice of Default on October 20, 1986. The Strongs' bankruptcy also 
delayed completion of that foreclosure. A notice of default and 
notice of sale were prepared and recorded by Scenic Rail's trustee 
and the Property was sold at trustee's sale for $30,000.00 on 
February 23, 1987 to United Bond Finance Corp. ("United Bond"). 
(Complaint Paragraph 12; Guardian Title Answer Paragraph 10; USLife 
Answer Paragraph 6; Wolfert Deposition Pages 26 and 27.) 
18. American and its trustee received copies of the 
Scenic Rail Notice of Default and Notice of Sale. Mr. Perry's 
office checked the title policy issued by Guardian and USLife and 
determined that American's trust deed was in first position. Thus, 
Mr. Perry and American believed that a second trust deed or junior 
trust deed was foreclosing and was not concerned that American's 
trust deed would be foreclosed out. This belief was supported by 
the fact that American's trustee had ordered and received a 
foreclosure report from a third party title company to aid in 
foreclosure of American's trust deed. This foreclosure report 
indicated that the Scenic Rail trust deed was a "Second Trust Deed". 
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(Perry Deposition Pages 37, 47 and 48; Burns Deposition Pages 21 and 
49. ) 
19. During American's foreclosure sale, American was 
notified by a third-party title company who was searching for 
federal tax liens that its interest in the property had been 
foreclosed by Scenic Rail. American immediately notified Guardian 
and USLife by letter dated March 9, 1987 of the Scenic Rail 
foreclosure and demanded payment of the full amount of the title 
policy plus interest because of the complete failure of American's 
trust deed. A copy of said demand letter is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "D". Guardian and USLife have refused to pay any sums to 
American. USLife has offered a judgment for $27,131.19. However, 
acceptance of this judgment is contingent upon settlement in full by 
American. (Perry Deposition Page 15; Complaint Paragraph 16 and 
Exhibit "C" to Complaint; Guardian Title Answer Paragraph 14; USLife 
Answer Paragraph 10.) 
20. Mr. L. Lynn Mabey, a Utah attorney, immediately 
called American's counsel, Mr. Perry, to discuss the claim made by 
American. Mr. Mabey indicated that he felt it would be prudent for 
him, as counsel for American, to file a state court action to set 
aside the Scenic Rail trustee's sale and to file an action in the 
Strongs' bankruptcy to reopen the bankruptcy and object to the 
discharge of American's debt. During the course of several 
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conversations between March 9, 1987 and March 18, 1987, Mr. Mabey 
and Mr. Perry fully discussed the facts that were then unfolding. 
They also considered strategy and legal theories of recovery. These 
discussions were held because of the express representation of Mr. 
Mabey that he was the title company's attorney hired to represent 
American. Mr. Mabey filed the state court action and the motion to 
reopen the Strongs' bankruptcy purporting to represent American. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit "E" is the front page of the state court 
Complaint filed by Mr. Mabey for his "client", American. Mr. Mabey 
confirmed his legal representation of American as its attorney by 
letter of March 13, 1987 to Ms. Leila Brand, an employee and officer 
of American. A copy of said letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"F". On April 17, 1987, Mr. John T. Anderson sent a letter to Ms. 
Brand, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "G", indicating 
that he represented the title insurer and that Mr. Mabey was not 
authorized to represent American. This letter was one month after 
full and open discussions between Mr. Mabey and Mr. Perry concerning 
the facts and legal strategy of American. Mr. Anderson, thereafter, 
forced Mr. Mabey to dismiss the state court action and cease any and 
all representation of American in either the state court or 
bankruptcy actions. On July 6, 1987, Mr. Anderson sent a letter to 
Mr. Perry's law firm denying coverage of American under the policy. 
A copy of this letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "H". This 
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denial was based upon the discussions between Mr. Mabey and Mr. 
Perry while Mr. Mabey purported to represent American. Mr. 
Anderson's letter clearly admits that USLife's defenses were founded 
upon these discussions. American filed the present lawsuit and Mr. 
Mabey and Mr. Anderson appeared as counsel for the defendants, 
Guardian and USLife. (Perry Affidavit.) 
21. American has incurred $28,819.50 attorneys fees and 
$1,134.76 costs of court in prosecution of this action through the 
date of this memorandum, which fees were necessary and reasonable. 
(Perry Affidavit.) 
22. The amount due to American under the Strong loan on 
February 1, 1986, the date the Strongs defaulted on their loan with 
American, was $82,651.51 including interest, late fees and reserve 
shortage. The amount due to American on the date that Scenic Rail 
completed its foreclosure, February 23, 1987, was $95,380.15, 
including interest, late fees and reserve shortage. (Affidavit of 
American.) 
23. The fair market value of the property on the date of 
American's loan was $90,500.00, well in excess of the amount loaned 
to the Strongs (Affidavit of American). 
24. After the present lawsuit was filed, the parties took 
the deposition of a Mr. Mark A. Wolfert, who acted as trustee for 
Scenic Rail in its foreclosure. In the deposition, Mr. Wolfert 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, a California 
eorporat ion, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
US LIFE TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF DALLAS aka TITLE 
USA INSURANCE CORPORATION, a 
Texas corporation, and 
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF 
UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT GUARDIAN TITLE 
COMPANY'S MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-87-4811 
Assigned to Judge Moffat 
Defendant Guardian Title Company ("Guardian") submits 
the following memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment: 
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For the purposes of responding to Plaintiff's Motion, 
y».WV 
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and Statement of Facts only, Guardian submits the following 
(paragrpah numbers correspond to the numbered paragraphs in 
Plaintiff's memorandum in support): 
1. Undisputed. 
2. Undisputed. 
3. Disputed. Guardian disputes Plaintiff's statement 
that "The Strongs thereafter approached United Savings for a 
loan..." (Emphasis added). The commitment for title insurance 
issued by Guardian was issued on the effective date, December 
14, 1983, to United Savings as proposed insured (see Exhibit 1 
documents-commitment specifically marked as page 526 and 527 to 
Anderson deposition and see Anderson deposition, pages 30 and 
31). The commitment and testimony of Fay Anderson controverts 
specifically Plaintiff's allegation that the Strongs approached 
United Savings after they had obtained a loan from Scenic 
Rail. They had obviously approached United Savings prior to 
obtaining the loan. Moreover, the only commitment which 
purportedly showed the status of the title was issued prior to 
the date that the Strongs obtained the Scenic Rail loan 
(December 30, 1983) and a substantial amount of time prior to 
the recording of the Scenic Rail trust deed (February 14, 
1984). The December 14, 1983 commitment was the only 
commitment obtained prior to the subject loan closing and 
appears to have been accurate based on the condition of the 
i 
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title at the time the commitment was issued. Guardian does not 
dispute that the loan was apparently brokered by United to 
"FCA" nor that the loan was intended to be secured by a first 
trust deed on the property. 
4. Undisputed. 
5. Disputed. Guardian does not dispute that a true 
copy of the written Contract of Agency is appended as Exhibit 
"Aff. Guardian states that the contract speaks for itself and 
disputes any attempt by Plaintiff to draw conclusions by 
references to specific portions of the contract without reading 
the entirety of the contract in context. 
6. Undisputed, subject to the qualification that 
American, as used, is being treated as the successor to FCA. 
7. Undisputed, except that Plaintiff's 
characterization or interpretation of the Exhibit "C" escrow 
instructions is incorrect. The escrow instructions require 
proof of payment of the encumbrances set forth in the 
commitment which is referenced by its date of December 14, 1983 
issued to United Savings and requires further that Guardian 
take such steps as to cause the title company (U.S. Life) to 
issue a policy insuring American's trust deed as a first lien 
on the property. 
8. Disputed. The closing officer, Fay Anderson, who 
was charged with the responsibility and duty of making 
disbursements and handling the loan closing, did not become 
consciously aware that the Scenic Rail loan was still 
outstanding and secured by a valid and subsisting trust deed 
until after the loan closing and disbursement of loan proceeds 
(see Anderson deposition, pages 49-51). Plaintiff's reference 
to its paragraphs in the complaint and Guardian's answer 
plainly do not support the claim made by Plaintiff in paragraph 
8. 
9. Disputed. Guardian disputes that its closing 
officer, Ms. Anderson, consciously knew or became aware that 
the Scenic trust deed and loan was still outstanding until 
after the closing and disbursement of loan proceeds (see No. 
8). Guardian does not dispute that it issued the title policy 
insuring American's trust deed as a first as required under the 
prior commitment and the escrow instructions, nor does Guardian 
dispute that between the date of the loan closing and after the 
disbursement of loan proceeds Guardian became aware that the 
Scenic trust deed was still outstanding and the loan had not 
been paid off and realized that a mistake had been made. 
Guardian disputes the statement made by Plaintiff that the 
policy represents that American was in a first position. 
Guardian does not dispute that the policy insures American's 
trust deed as a first lien. 
k ;•• VJK: 
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10. Disputed. Guardian disputes the claim that 
American was under the belief that its loan was closed as 
instructed. Guardian has no idea what American's belief was 
and nothing referenced by Plaintiff in support of this 
statement acts as evidence or provides an evidentiary basis for 
such statement. Guardian does not dispute that it did not 
advise American of the Scenic Rail trust deed once it had 
discovered on a conscious level that such trust deed was still 
outstanding and recorded first in time. 
11. Disputed. Guardian disputes the statement that 
Guardian and U.S. Life tried to "cover up the problem.11 No 
such evidentiary support is referenced for such conclusion by 
Plaintiff. Guardian does not dispute that it contacted the 
Strongs in an attempt to obtain their agreement to pay off the 
Scenic trust deed, nor does Guardian dispute that it contacted 
Scenic Rail Credit union and attempted to obtain a 
subordination agreement. 
12. Undisputed, except Plaintiff's statement that no 
one at Guardian felt that it was their responsibility to obtain 
a release. 
13. Disputed. Guardian admits that Ms. Killpack was 
familiar with the Utah Code provision cited which permits the 
recording of a request for notice. However, she stated in her 
deposition that she did not think of or consider using such 
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procedure. Ms. Killpack also testified that she expected that 
Guardian would be notified by reason of its having been a 
designated trustee under the FCA-American trust deed by virtue 
of the customary practice of providing a notice of default to 
the trustee on a junior trust deed. 
14. Undisputed. 
15. Undisputed. 
16. Disputed. Guardian does not dispute that American 
commenced foreclosure proceedings after the default of the 
Strongs, nor that American's counsel substituted himself as 
trustee under the trust deed. Guardian does not dispute that 
one foreclosure report obtained by Mr. Perry referenced the 
title of the Scenic Rail trust deed as a second trust deed. 
Guardian disputes Plaintiff's claim that only a "meticulous 
review of the foreclosure report" would have revealed that the 
Scenic trust deed was prior in recording date to the American 
trust deed. Guardian also disputes Plaintiff's claim that it 
did not notice that the Scenic Rail trust deed was recorded 
first and disputes its claim that it believed that the Scenic 
Rail was a second trust deed. Guardian disputes such facts 
notwithstanding that Mr. Perry and Ms. Burns have said in their 
testimony that they did not notice or realize that the Scenic 
Rail trust deed was recorded first. The testimony of Burns and 
Perry also shows that they understood that it was customary for 
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a foreclosure report to list liens and encumbrances in the 
order which they were recorded and that the Scenic Rail trust 
deed was listed before the American trust deed on the 
foreclosure report. The issue of whether or not American, 
through its separate officers or through Mr. Perry and Ms. 
Burns as their counsel and trustee, knew or noticed the 
recording dates and the order of listing of the trust deeds on 
the foreclosure report is a factual dispute and is subject to 
the trier of fact's determination based on reasonable 
inferences to be drawn by testimony, the documents and other 
facts to be offered at trial. (See Perry deposition, pages 47 
and 48, testimony by Mr. Perry that he received Scenic Rail's 
notice of trustee's sale and remembers asking his paralegal to 
check and see if the Scenic Rail foreclosure would foreclose 
out American's interest). 
17. Undisputed, except the amount for which the 
property was sold at the trustee's sale was less than 
f28,000.00 (see Wolfert deposition). 
18. Disputed. Guardian does not dispute that American 
and its counsel both received copies of Scenic Rail's notice of 
default and notice of sale, and a foreclosure report that 
showed the recording dates for the respective trust deeds. The 
remainder of the factual statement is disputed for the reasons 
set forth under paragraph 16. 
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19. Disputed. Guardian had heretofore thought that 
Mr. Perry and Ms. Burns first received notice of the 
foreclosure sale of Scenic Rail when Guardian's counsel 
telephoned Mr. Perry on March 9, 1987 (see affidavit of L. 
Benson Mabey). Guardian admits that American sent the letter 
set forth as Exhibit wD n to Guardian dated March 9, 1987 which 
it subsequently received on March 12, 1987. Guardian disputes 
that U.S. Life refused to pay the amount actually bid for the 
property at the Scenic Rail trustee's sale and affirmatively 
alleges that it now understands that Mr. Perry also realizes 
that the amount, together with interest by a check for 
$29,957.30, was in fact paid and accepted by Mr. Perry's former 
law firm. 
20. Disputed. Guardian does not dispute the 
authenticity of the documents set forth and referenced as 
Exhibits "E", "F", "G" and "H". Guardian disputes the alleged 
claim that confidentiality had arisen or that Mr. Mabey 
ascertained any factual information under a claim of 
representation or privilege (see affidavit of L. Benson Mabey 
and see letter from Mr. Mabey attached as Exhibit "F" which 
refers in part to the discussion and agreement between Mr. 
Mabey and Mr. Perry that the state court action and bankruptcy 
court motion were brought under reservation of rights and that 
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copies of such pleadings would be furnished to Mr. Perry who 
was counsel for American), 
21. Disputed. Guardian has had no opportunity to 
examine the time entries or conduct discovery respecting the 
same (see affidavit of L. Benson Mabey). 
22. Undisputed. 
23. Disputed. The affidavit of American does not 
comply with Rule 56(e) U.R.C.P. with respect to the claim of 
fair market value since there is no demonstration of 
appropriate foundation. Guardian also points out that the 
value on such date is irrelevant to any claim of loss or 
damages in these proceedings. 
24. Disputed. The testimony and other factual matters 
referred to in paragraph 24 are subject to inconsistencies in 
testimony and other documents and testimony that conflict with 
the same. The trier of fact must hear the facts, weigh the 
evidence, draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and 
weigh the credibility of witnesses after observation of such 
test imony. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE WHERE 
THERE EXISTS GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT. 
